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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No.

- vs TERRY SHANNON ADAMS,
Defendant and Appellant.

12523

BRIEF O,F APP'ELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a criminal action which was instituted by
plaintiff, State of Utah, against the defendant, Terry
Shannon Adams, charging him with assault with a deadly
weapon, a felony.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The matter was tried before the Honorable Ronald
0. Hyde, sitting with a jury. The jury returned a verdict
finding the defendant guilty of assault with a deadly
weapon and a Judgment, Sentence and Commitment was
entered. From the action of the trial court the defendant
prosecutes this appeal.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks to have the verdict and judgment
of the trial court reversed or in the alternative for an
orders awarding him a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The information filed in the District Court of Weber
County, State of Utah, charges that the defendant Terry
Shannon Adams committed an assault with a deadly
weapon upon the body of one L. A. Miller on or about
November 8, 1970. (R. 7)
The incident giving rise to this action occurred between 11:00 p.m. on November 8, 1970 and 1:00 a.m.
on November 9, 1970 at a home located at 2352 Orchard
Avenue, Ogden, Utah, which was owned by the mother
of the defendant. Orchard Avenue runs in a North/South
direction and the Adams home is located on the East side
of the street. The Adams home has two windows, a door
and a porch on the West and windows on the North and
South. (R. 119-120).
At the time of the incident the defendant did not live
at the home on Orchard A venue but was living at an
apartment in Salt Lake City, Utah and attending Utah
Technical College. On the afternoon prior to the incident
occurring the defendant went to Ogden and apparently
spent some time drinking alcoholic beverages in bars in
the Ogden area. Some time during the late evening of
November 8, 1970 the defendant telephoned the Ogden
2

City Police Department and advised them that there were
prowlers near the Adams residence at 2352 Orchard
Avenue. (R. 144-146)
Several police officers including L. A. Miller, the
person upon whom the assault with a deadly weapon was
allegedly committed, responded to the call and proceeded
to the address on Orchard Avenue. The police officers
were familiar with the defendant and called into the
house to him when they arrived at the scene. The defendant responded with an obscenity and the statement that
the officers should come in and get him as he wanted to
kill one of them. (R. 5 5)
The police officers left the area of the Adams home
on Orchard Avenue but returned approximately one hour
later as a result of a notice from their dispatcher. At this
time the defendant fired a shot from the front room of
the Adams residence in a westerly direction allegedly at
or in the direction of the said L. A. Miller who was behind
an automobile parked in a driveway to the South of the
Adams residence. (R. 98-99)
Officer Miller testified that he heard some noise which
he thought may have been a bullet, however, he is very
vague and uncertain about this. (R. 99) Officer Liu was
behind a car across the street from the Adams residence
and also stated that he heard a noise which he thought
may have been a bullet in his direction. (R. 166)
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It should be noted that Officer Carroll who was
with Officer Miller behind the car to the South of the
Adams residence stated he did not hear anything which
he thought was a bullet at the time of the alleged assault.
(R. 78)
The defendant testified that he neither saw nor heard
any police officers in the vicinity at the time he fired the
shot through the front window of the Adams residence
from the living room. (R. 15 5) Shortly following the
shot through the front window the defendant fired another shot through an interior wall of the home and into
a bedroom located on the Northeast corner where no windows or doors to the outside existed. (R. 173)
During the course of the trial the defendant elected
to take the stand and testify in his own behalf and during
cros8 examination by the District Attorney he was asked
numerous questions about prior felony and misdemeanor
charges against him, about other "fights" in which he may
have been involved which may or many not have resulted
in criminal charges being filed against him and questions
about another incident where a shooting occurred and a
criminal charge of some nature was filed against the defendant but was later dismissed apparently without any
action being taken. (R. 152-154; 161-162)
The case was submitted to the jury who returned a
verdict finding the defendant guilty of assault with a
deadly weapon. (R. 32) Thereafter the Court entered
a Judgment, Sentence and Commitment. (R. 35)
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE SENTENCE IMPOSED ON THE DEFENDANT
BY THE COURT WAS INCORRECT.

The defendant was found guilty of the crime of
assault with a deadly weapon contrary to the provisions
of Section 76-7-6, Utah Code Annotated. This section
provides as follows:
"With a deadly weapon. - Every person who,
with intent to do bodily harm without just cause
or excuse, or when no considerable provocation
appears, or when the circumstances show an abandoned or malignant heart, commits an assault upon
the person of another with a deadly weapon, instrument or other thing is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not exceeding five years,
or by fine not exceeding $1,000, or by both." (emphasis added)
The Judgment, Sentence and Commitment to the
Utah State Prison entered by the Trial Court provided
in part as follows:
"IT IS THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED
AND DECREED, that the said Terry Shannon
Adams be sentenced to imprisonment in the Utah
State Prison for a term of not less than five years,
said sentence to begin as of February 16, 1971."
(emphasis added)
It is cfoady evident that the sentence imposed by the
trial court is not in accordance with the provisions of
Section 76-7-6, Utah Code Annotated. While in all prob-
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ability this error is clerical in nature it is of substance and
the case should be remanded with instructions that the
error be corrected and an appropriate sentence be ordered.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL
ERROR IN ALLOWING THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY TO QUESTION THE DEFENDANT ON MATTERS WHICH TEND,ED TO DEGRADE HIS CHARACTER, AND WHICH MAY HA VE CONSTITUTED
CRIMES FOR WHICH THE DEFENDANT MAY OR
MAY NOT HAVE BEEN CHARGED.

The following excerpts are from the cross examination of the defendant by the District Attorney after the
defendant had elected to take the stand and testify in his
own behalf:

"Q. You have listed the things that you were
convicted of. Of the things that you listed how
many have you left out?
A. I don't know. Oh, I have plead guilty
to a negligent homicide charge in which my wife
was killed.

Q.

And you were driving at the time she
was killed; were you not?
A. Yes, I was.

Q.

What else have you left out besides the
negligent homicide?
A. I don't know. I just don't know. I don't
keep track of them.

Q.

* * *

Now, you have been involved rn numerous fights; haven't you?
A. Yes, I have.

6

Q. You have been involved in numerous
assaults and batteries to which you have never
been booked or charged; is that true?
A.

When I was a teenager.

Q. Since the time you have been an adult
you have been involved in numerous fights that
you have not been booked or charged on; isn't
that true?
A.

Not to my knowledge.

Q. Not to your knowledge. You have been
involved in other shooting incidents where no
charge has been filed?
A.

No, sir. I haven't.

Q.

What about the Moose Lodge?

A.

No. I have not.

Q. That was yourself and Mr. Leadman and
Mr. Wilkerson; is that true? All three of you were
involved?
A.

I was there.

Q.

And how badly was that place shot up?

A.

That wasn't my doing.

Q.

How badly was that place shot up?

A. I have no idea. I know there were some
shots fired in there.

Q.

When was that?

A.

Two or three years ago.

Q.

That was in the spring of '69; wasn't it?

A.

Yes, I believe so.
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Q. And you weren't charged as a result of
that; were you?
A.

Yes, I was.

Q.

Were you charged?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Were you booked?

A.

Yes, I was.

Q. Was there any reason it doesn't show up
m your record?
A. It was dismissed against me. That was
one of the seven charges I was talking about.

Q.

One of the seven charges?

A.

Yes.

Q. How many times have you been arrested
on any other records, as long as we are talking
about arrests?
A.

On what other charges? Pardon me?

Q.

On what other matters, on what other
assaults and batteries or the use of guns?
A. I was charged with assault with a deadly
weapon in '69. I pleaded guilty to aggravated
assault on that charge. And in 1969 I pleaded
guilty to assault with a deadly weapon. (R. 152,
153, 159)

* * *

Q.

And so during that period of time you
were still involved in fights; though, weren't you?
A.

No, sir. I wasn't

Q.

Not at all?

A. You are speaking of the first year I was
in college?
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Q.

Yes.

A.

I was never in fights during the first year.

Q.

What about the second year?

A.

I was enrolled for a period of a month.

Q.

How many fights were you in then?

A. None."
(R. 162)
No objection to this line of questioning by the District Attorney was made by defense counsel at the time
of trial and he had inquired into the defendant's criminal
record on direct examination. (R. 141 and 142)
Section 78-24-9 Utah Code Annotated sets forth the
type of questions which may or may not be asked to a
witness or be answered by him when they may establish a claim against the witness or have a tendency to
degrade his character. This section provides as follows:
"Duty to answer questions - Privilege. - A witness must answer questions legal and pertinent to
the matters in issue, although his answer may
establish a claim against himself; but he need
never give an answer which will have a tendency
to subject him to punishment for a felony; nor
need he give an answer which will have a direct
tendency to degrade his character, unless it is to
the very fact in issue or to a fact from which the
fact in issue would be presumed. But a witness
must answer as to the fact of his previous conviction of a felony."
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In the instant case the defendant was asked about
his prior felony convictions and he gave answers to the
same which was appropriate under the statute. However,
the cross examination by the District Attorney went far
afield from questions about prior felony convictions and
included questions about possible assaults and batteries
committed by the defendant, possible fights in which
defendant had been involved, a shooting incident in
which defendant was involved for which he was apparently charged with the crime of assault with a deadly
weapon and which was dismissed, none of which had any
reltaion to the offense for which the defendant was being
tried.
In the case of State vs. Kazda, 14 Utah 2d 266, 382
P.2d 407, the defendant was charged with the crime of
assault with intent to commit murder and robbery. An
FBI agent who had arrested the defendant was permitted
to testify about a conversation between the agent and the
defendant relating to various crimes other than the one
with which the defendant was being tried. The trial court
advised the jury that any mention of any crimes other
than the one with which the defendant was being tried
should be disregarded by them, however, the Supreme
Court held that this testimony was prejudiced to the
defendant and stated as follows:
"We deem the foregoing to constitute prejudicial
error. It implied that the defendant was implicated
in other crimes, none of them proven, and could
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have no other effect than to degrade the defendant
and give to the jury the impression that he had a
propensity for crime. It is true that the defendant
admitted prior felony convictions, but we cannot
say with any degree of assurance that there would
not have been a different result in the absence of
such testimony." (14 Utah 2d, at p. 269)
In State vs. Edwards, 13 Utah 2d 51, the defendant
was charged with the crime of "profiting from the earnings of a fallen woman." The defendant testified in his
own behalf and upon cross examination by the prosecutor
was asked questions about time he had spent in jail in
Nevada and California for drunkenness and vagrancy.
The Court held that the cross examination was improper
and constituted prejudicial error and stated as follows:
"A defendant in a criminal case may not be questioned as to matters wholly remote from the question of guilt or innocence of the crime charged,
so as to amount to a general assault on his character. The cross examination, here complained of,
relates to matters wholly remote and collateral."
(13 Utah 2d at p. 55)
In State vs. Peterson, 23 Utah 2d 58, 457 P.2d 532,
the District Attorney was allowed to interrogate the defendant on cross examination about his knowledge and
use of marijuana in a trial where he was charged with
the crime of selling LSD. The Court noted that the defendant's use of marijuana in itself would constitute a
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crime and that it was prejudicial error to allow the District Attorney to question the defendant concerning this
matter.
See also State vs. Dickson, 12 Utah 2d 8, 361 P.2d
where the Supreme Court held that it was prejudicial
error to allow the District Attorney to cross examine a
defendant who was being tried for the crime of robbery
about a subsequent incident in which he had been charged
with being an accessory to attempted robbery.
It could be argued that the failure of defense counsel
to object to the line of questioning being pursued by the
District Attorney prevents the defendant from claiming
error in relation to the same on appeal. However, in
dealing with this question the Supreme Court has held
that such an objection need not be made nor need the
privilege be claimed by the defendant in order to claim
prejudicial error on appeal. In the case of State vs. Hougensen, 91 Utah 351, 64 P.2d 229, the Supreme Court
noted as follows:

"The witness, I\Irs. Miller, or her counsel, did not
claim the privilege. Therefore, this court must
determine whether, independent of said statute, it
is the right of the cross examiner in this jurisdiction to bring out matters which may reflect on the
character of the witness. Certainly, if counsel,
knowing that a witness should not be compelled
to answer, regardless of the exercise of her personal privilege, should by asking a number of
questions which implied immorality, for the purpose of carrying to the jury such impression and
which it was fairly evident did carry to the jury
12

such impression, this court might reverse the case
with censure on counsel, whether or not the witness claimed her privilege." (64 P.2d at p. 234)
The reason for the rule is obviously that the asking
of such questions by the prosecutor places the witness in
the position of claiming the privilege which carries an
impression to the jury that the answers to the same would
be adverse to the witness. The Court in the Hougensen
case in explaining this stated as follow:
"If a witness for the defendant is discredited by
showing on cross examination the commission of
certain crimes, that may prejudice a jury against
such witness and in that way affect the defendant's
case, but if the defendant is thus cross examined
it, in effect, amounts to more than prejudice. It
practically puts him on trial for other offenses.
And if he avoids answering by claiming his personal privilege, it carries to the jury an impression
of admission." (64 P.2d at p. 236) (emphasis added)
The rule which prevents the prosecutor from asking
the defendant on cross examination about other incidents
which may be crimes or other crimes with which he has
been charged but not convicted even though no objection
is made or privilege claimed was reitterated by the
Supreme Court in the Edwards case, supra, as follows:
"The defendant need not answer, and therefore
the prosecutor should not ask, questions which
have a tendency to degrade his character, unless
such answers relate to the very fact in issue or to
a fact from which the fact in issue would be presumed." (13 Utah 2d at p. 55) (emphasis added)

13

Also in the case of State vs. Schad, 24 Utah 2d 255,
269 P.2d 1022, in discussing the necessity of a proper
objection being made at the time of trial, the Court
stated as follows:
"However, we recognize that if it appears that
the interests of justice so require, this court may
review claimed errors even in the absence of a
proper objection." (24 Utah 2d at p. 259, 160)
Clearly the questions asked by the District Attorney
were improper and prejudicial to the defendant and the
fact that no objection was made at the time of trial does
not preclude defendant from asserting this error on
appeal.
POINT III
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONCLUDE THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS GUILTY
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT OF AN ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON.

As indicated above, the incident giving rise to this
action occurred when the defendant fired a shot from
inside a home located at 2352 Orchard Avenue, Ogden,
Utah at one L. A. Miller, an Ogden City Police Officer.
At the time the shot was allegedly fired at L. A. Miller,
he and Officer Carroll were standing behind an automobile which was parked in a driveway to the South of the
house occupied by the defendant. The testimony of Officer Miller in this regard is as follows:

"Q.

What did you do then?
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A. I walked up the east side of the rear of
the car that, it was either a '59 or '60 white Chevrolet, sitting in the driveway right next to 2352,
where Mr. Adams was.
I could see Mr. Adams through a window on
the - it would be the South side of the residence.
He was standing in the window, had something in
his hands, some type of container in his hand.
I yelled out: 'Terry, this is the police, do you
want to talk to us?'
Mr. Adams immediately crossed across the
room. Again I could observe him through the
front window of the home. He immediately
switched off the light, putting the residence into
darkness. And shortly after the residence went
into darkness a shot rang out in my area. There
was a bullet apparently came in my area.
I ducked down behind the car and took shelter
to the house just to the South.

Q. What do you mean 'the bullet apparently
came in your area'? Will you tell us what happened?
A. Well, the shot rang out. The front window, of course, exploded from the impact of the
shell. I heard a sound which I would imagine was
a bullet. I can't say; I couldn't see the bullet.

Q.

* * *

What was the sound? What did it sound
like? You say you heard the sound of a bullet or
something. Where was that in your area?
A. Just up over my head area. Whether it
was just me digging my way down to cover. I believe it could have been a bullet. (R. 93, 94)

* * *
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Q. Well, now where did the bullet go then?
Did it go into west Ogden?
A. I have no idea where it went. I did not
recover the bullet so I don't know.

Q. You can't say in which direction the defendant fired?
A. No, I can't say. All I can say is what I
thought." (R. 99)
It is of importance to note that Officer Carroll who
was with Officer Miller at the time the shot was allegedly
fired at him heard nothing which indicated to him that
a shot had come in their direction. His testimony in ths
regard is as follows:

"Q. Do you have any idea where that shot
landed or in which direction it was fired?
A. Other than it was fired through the front
of the house, all I saw was the glass from the
window. I couldn't testify where the bullet went,
no.
Q. But you had no knowledge of the bullet
landing anywhere in the vicinity of the car where
you were hiding; is that correct?
A.

No, sir." (R. 78)

From the foregoing it is apparent that the only evidence that the defendant fired a shot at or in the direction of Officer Miller is the testimony of Officer Miller
and Officer Carroll that a shot was fired from inside the
front room of the house out of a window which faces
west and Officer Miller heard something which he
thought may have been a bullet. Officer Miller's testi-
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mony concerning this is at best vague and appears insufficient to submit the case to the jury on the theory that
the shot was fired at him or in his direction. This is also
particularly true where Officer Carroll who was with
Officer Miller heard nothing which would indicate that
the bullet came in the direction in which he and Officer
Miller were located.
In view of the fact that the house was dark at the
time the defendant allegedly fired the shot at or in the
direction of Officer Miller, the State must prove by circumstantial evidence that the defendant had the ability
and intent to commit the assault on Officer Miller. The
circumstantial evidence supporting these elements of
the alleged crime must be looked upon with caution and
must exclude every reasonable hypothesis except the guilt
of the defendant. See State vs. Schad, 24 Utah 2d 255,
470 P.2d 246; State vs. Garcia, 355 P.2d 57, 11 Utah 2d
67; State vs. Birch, 100 Utah 414, 115 P.2d 911.
The circumstantial evidence offered by the State m
support of these elements of the offense was sparse and inconclusive. Officer Liu, who entered the house shortly
after the defendant was arrested testified as follows:

"Q.

Were you able to observe where the
hole in the window was?

A. I can't directly testify to the exact location of the hole other than there was a hole in the
front window. I didn't pay much attention to it,
because we had our servicemen or our lab people
coming up later on, so my main concern upon entering the home was to insure that it was clear."
17

The record does not disclose whether or not the servicemen or lab people referred to by Officer Liu ever inspected
the home, however, none were called to testify on behalf
of the State.
Phillip D. Sears, the brother-in-law of the defendant
inspected the home, including the window, so that he
could make the necessary repairs shortly after the incident. His testimony is to the effect that the bullet hole
was in the upper pane of two panes which are each 33 by
33 inches. And, more importantly, that the window was
covered by a curtain on the inside on which a powder
burn and hole adjacent to the bullet hole in the window
pane existed and that the hole in the window pane was
slightly above the hole in the curtain. This would place
the bullet in a trajectory away from officer Miller. (R. 136
through 13 8)

CONCLUSION
The sentence imposed by the trial court was incorrect and the case should be remanded for the imposition
of a correct sentence.
The cross examination of the defendant by the District Attorney concerning "fights", "assaults and bat·
teries", and incidents involving "guns" which the defendant either denied or for which he was either not charged
or not convicted constituted prejudicial error and the case
should be remanded for a new trial.
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The evidence introduced by the State including the
circumstantial evidence introduced to prove the ability
and the intent of the defendant to commit the offense for
which he was charged was insufficient to submit the same
to the jury and the verdict and judgment should be
reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN

J. Anthony Eyre
Attorneys for Appellant
520 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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